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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Schools are a unique and paradoxical environment in the context 
of First Amendment jurisprudence. The fundamental freedoms of 
speech and expression are important to the main goals of schools in 
that they facilitate learning, experience, communication, and expres-
sion, all of which contribute to the creation of a marketplace of ideas. 
Yet, in order to effectively promote these educational goals, schools 
must maintain order and protect children. Thus, public schools’ regu-
lation of online speech begs the question of what is in students’ best 
interests and where the line should be drawn between (1) promoting 
expression and the creation of a school-wide marketplace of ideas and 
(2) protecting children and maintaining order. At what point are 
schools protecting children rather than infringing upon their vital 
fundamental rights? The Supreme Court has stated that students do 
not enjoy the same level of First Amendment protection as their 
adult counterparts because of the special characteristics of the school 
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environment, which require schools to act as a custodian responsible 
for the school children.1 
 Technological innovation has significantly transformed the way 
that people of all ages communicate and express their views. The ad-
vent of the Internet, social media, and the like has created a new 
type of speech which differs dramatically from prior forms of speech, 
both in its accessibility and corresponding lack of privacy. Student 
speech cases from the late twentieth century reveal the difficulty 
courts face in attempting to strike a balance between protecting stu-
dents’ First Amendment rights and shielding children from the det-
rimental effects of disruptive student speech. The prominence of 
online student speech, which is typically created, shared, and ac-
cessed off-campus, has further exacerbated this precarious dilemma 
by obscuring schools’ ability to regulate student speech. The uniquely 
pervasive nature of this speech has affected parents’ and teachers’ 
ability to monitor and control student speech, as well as protect chil-
dren from its potentially detrimental effects.2 
 This Note analyzes the current state of uncertainty plaguing First 
Amendment jurisprudence, focusing on the questions implicated by 
the advent of student-created online speech, and it ultimately con-
cludes that a modified version of the material and substantial disrup-
tion standard adopted in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Commu-
nity School District3 is the best standard for deciding such speech 
cases. Part II discusses the evolution of Supreme Court doctrine re-
garding public schools’ ability to restrict student speech, emphasizing 
the Court’s increasingly restrictive, deferential trend. Part III ex-
plains why the Supreme Court’s extremely limited holding in its most 
recent student speech case, Morse v. Frederick, has left lower courts 
without a discernible standard for online student speech cases, ana-
lyzing the various approaches used by lower courts grappling with 
this issue.4 Part IV discusses potential solutions to the issue of regu-
lating online student speech, explaining the various approaches and 
their likely implications.  
II.   THE EVOLUTION OF SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE:  
FROM PROTECTIVE TO DEFERENTIAL 
 Student speech jurisprudence has evolved and changed signifi-
cantly over the last seventy years, with increasing challenges to new 
                                                                                                                                           
 1. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). Similarly, students 
do not enjoy the same level of Fourth Amendment protection in the context of searches 
conducted at school. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 394 (2007); see also infra Part III.A.  
 2. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 424 (Alito, J., concurring).  
 3. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 passim (1969); see 
also infra Part II.A.  
 4. See generally Morse, 551 U.S. 393.  




forms and modes of expression. In its early cases, the Supreme Court 
demonstrated a willingness to protect students’ First Amendment 
rights unless a school was able to demonstrate a constitutionally val-
id and compelling reason for restricting those rights, maintaining 
that “[s]chool officials do not possess absolute authority over their 
students” because “state-operated schools may not be enclaves of to-
talitarianism.”5 In the last twenty-five years, there has been a dra-
matic departure from this protective viewpoint, with the Court show-
ing an increasing willingness to restrict students’ rights and defer to 
school officials’ disciplinary decisions. However, these cases have 
been decided using a wide array of standards and lines of reasoning, 
generating much doctrinal ambiguity and making it difficult to de-
termine what the controlling standard is for these types of cases. In 
the most recent student speech case, Morse, the student expression 
occurred in a unique setting, giving the Court the opportunity to both 
clarify the standard for traditional student speech cases and to ex-
pand on existing doctrine to incorporate new forms of communica-
tion, including online speech.6 The Court avoided answering these 
difficult questions and decided Morse on extremely narrow grounds.7 
This further exacerbated the existing uncertainty surrounding stu-
dents’ First Amendment rights for both traditional and new forms    
of expression. 
A.  An Initially Protective View of Students’ First Amendment Rights 
 The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of students’ First 
Amendment rights in the context of laws and regulations requiring 
public school students to salute and pledge allegiance to the Ameri-
can flag.8 The Court held that such laws and regulations unconstitu-
tionally violated students’ First Amendment protection against com-
pelled expression or forced speech.9 The Court’s expansive view of 
students’ First Amendment rights in this context suggested that it 
was willing to protect these rights in other school contexts, as well.  
 Less than three decades later, the Court articulated what has be-
come the seminal standard for deciding student speech cases in Tink-
er v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.10 The Court 
agreed with the district court and held that the “wearing of an arm-
band for the purpose of expressing certain views is the type of sym-
bolic act that is within the Free Speech Clause of the First Amend-
                                                                                                                                           
 5. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.  
 6. See 551 U.S. 393 passim. 
 7. See id. at 409-10.  
 8. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overruling Minersville 
Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)). 
 9. See id. at 641-42.  
 10. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503.  
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ment.”11 The students were protesting the Vietnam War, and the 
Court determined that their action was “entirely divorced from actu-
ally or potentially disruptive conduct” and “was closely akin to ‘pure 
speech’ which . . . is entitled to comprehensive protection under the 
First Amendment.”12  The Court reaffirmed that students (and teach-
ers) enjoy First Amendment protection, despite “the special charac-
teristics of the school environment,” noting that “[i]t can hardly be 
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”13  
 While firmly asserting that students enjoy First Amendment 
rights at school, the Court also stressed the need to strike a balance 
between competing interests.14 It stated “[t]hat [schools] are educat-
ing the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of 
Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle 
the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important 
principles of our government as mere platitudes.”15 The importance of 
protecting these constitutional rights must be balanced with “the 
need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of 
school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safe-
guards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.”16 Thus, the 
issue in this case, and most subsequent school speech cases, is where 
to strike the balance between these competing, antithetical interests 
when school rules infringe upon students’ exercise of their First 
Amendment rights.17 
 The Tinker Court indicated that striking such a balance should be 
based on the effect of the student speech rather than its message.18 It 
concluded that student conduct that occurs “in class or out of it, 
which for any reason—whether it stems from time, place, or type of 
behavior—materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial dis-
order or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized 
by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.”19 The Court 
explicitly rejected the idea that school officials could regulate speech 
based on the content or message expressed, stating that school offi-
cials who restrict student expression “must be able to show that 
[their] action was caused by something more than a mere desire to 
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an 
                                                                                                                                           
 11. Id. at 505 (affirming the district court’s recognition that the students’ actions 
qualified as protected symbolic speech). 
 12. Id. at 505-06. 
 13. Id. at 506.  
 14. Id. at 507.  
 15. Id. (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. at 508-10. 
 19. Id. at 513.  




unpopular viewpoint.”20 Thus, whether student expression is protect-
ed primarily turns on the effect of that expression—whether it mate-
rially disrupts class work, involves substantial disorder, or invades 
the rights of others. Because the student expression in Tinker was 
not shown to have produced any of these prohibited effects, the stu-
dents’ expression was protected, and the school’s disciplinary action 
was unconstitutional.21  
 In subsequent student speech cases, the Court continued to exhib-
it a protective, broad view of students’ First Amendment rights. The 
Court held that a college could not engage in viewpoint discrimina-
tion by excluding a student group due to its views, even if the group 
advocated a destructive or violent philosophy.22 Such speech was pro-
tected unless it was found to satisfy the legal standard for incite-
ment, thus constituting dangerous speech.23 Similarly, a college could 
not expel a student because he used coarse, vulgar language and 
drew a potentially offensive political cartoon in an off-campus under-
ground newspaper.24 The student’s speech was protected because it 
was political speech expressed in an off-campus underground news-
paper, and it did not violate other students’ rights or cause a sub-
stantial disruption.25 Similarly, the Court held that a school could not 
engage in viewpoint discrimination by removing books from its li-
brary merely because it disapproved of the ideas they expressed; 
however, books could be removed if they were obscene and vulgar.26 
The First Amendment, which prohibits the suppression of ideas, pro-
tects not only students’ right to speak but also their right to receive 
information and access others’ speech.27 The Court continued affirma-
tively to protect students’ First Amendment rights until 1986, when 
it retreated from its protective stance in Bethel School District No. 





 20. Id. at 509; see also id. at 510 (discussing that the school in this case acted in an 
attempt to “avoid the controversy which might result from the expression, even by the 
silent symbol of armbands, of opposition to this Nation’s part in the conflagration in 
Vietnam”); id. at 511 (stating students “may not be confined to the expression of those 
sentiments that are officially approved”).  
 21. See id. at 514. 
 22. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 188-92 (1972). 
 23. See id. at 188 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (unanimous 
per curiam opinion)). 
 24. Papish v. Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 670-71 (1973). 
 25. Id.  
 26. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982). 
 27. See id. at 870-71.  
 28.  478 U.S. 675 (1986).  
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B.  Retreating from Tinker and Deferring to School Authority  
 Beginning with Bethel, the Supreme Court has seemingly aban-
doned its protective view of students’ First Amendment rights, 
demonstrating an increased willingness to defer to school authority 
for regulating student speech. In Bethel, a student was suspended for 
a speech he gave at a school assembly, in which he referred to the 
student he nominated for elective office using “an elaborate, graphic, 
and explicit sexual metaphor.”29 The Court upheld his suspension 
and distinguished the case from Tinker based on both the content of 
the speech and its effect.30 It reasoned that, unlike the Tinker stu-
dents’ “nondisruptive, passive expression of a political viewpoint,”31 
this was sexually-charged, “offensively lewd and indecent speech,” 
which was “unrelated to any political viewpoint.”32 Such speech is 
unprotected because it would “undermine the school’s basic educa-
tional mission.”33 Additionally, the state has a long-recognized inter-
est in protecting minors by shielding an unsuspecting audience from 
exposure to vulgar and offensive speech.34  
 Based on these findings, the Court held that the school was within 
its rights to punish the speaker based on its disciplinary code, which 
prohibited such speech and gave potential violators fair warning that 
uttering such words might warrant disciplinary action.35 The Court 
noted that public school students’ rights “are not automatically coex-
tensive with the rights of adults in other settings.”36 Thus, the Court 
upheld this restriction on student speech based on both its offensive 
content and its effect in that it interfered with the rights of others.37 
The Court applied Tinker and found that this speech infringed upon 
the rights of others, but it also distinguished Tinker based on the na-
ture of the speech at issue.38 Bethel dealt with a student’s sexual, of-
fensive speech, while Tinker involved students’ political speech;39 
thus, one justice explained that these cases were not entirely analo-
gous based on the incongruent subject matter.40 
 Two years later, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the 
Court expanded upon its decision from Bethel and upheld public 
school officials’ right to exercise editorial control over the contents of 
                                                                                                                                           
 29. Id. at 677-78. 
 30. Id. at 680. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 685.  
 33. Id. 
 34. See id. at 684-85. 
 35. See id. at 686. 
 36. Id. at 682. 
 37. See id. at 685-86.  
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 685. 
 40. Id. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring). 




a high school newspaper written and edited by the school’s journal-
ism class.41 When presented with the proofs, the school principal pro-
hibited two of the articles from being published because he objected 
to their content.42 One was about the effect of divorce on Hazelwood 
students, and one was about three Hazelwood students’ pregnancy 
experiences.43 The Court determined that because the newspaper was 
a “supervised learning experience for journalism students” and not a 
forum for public expression, “school officials were entitled to regulate 
the contents of [the newspaper] in any reasonable manner.”44 Based 
on this finding, the Court determined that the issue was whether the 
First Amendment required public schools to affirmatively promote 
certain student speech, distinguishing it from the issue in Tinker, 
which was whether the First Amendment required public schools to 
tolerate certain political student speech.45  
 Thus, the issue was the scope of public schools’ authority over 
school-sponsored publications, theatrical shows, and other expressive 
activities within the school’s curriculum, such that the public may 
consider the message to be affirmatively promoted by the school.46 
Even if such activities occur beyond the boundaries of the traditional 
school setting, they are still considered part of the school curriculum 
if school officials supervise them and if they are intended to teach 
skills and knowledge to student actors and audiences.47 Based on the 
nature of this category of expression, officials must have broad au-
thority to ensure that the goals of such expression are achieved     
and to prevent the unintended negative consequences of this type            
of expression.48  
 The Court reasoned that schools must be allowed to set high 
standards for student expression conveyed through these types of 
school-endorsed channels, and that right includes the ability to re-
fuse to endorse expression that falls short of such high standards.49 
Thus, it seems that schools have the right to dissociate themselves 
from such speech if it causes disorder or a substantial disruption, in-
fringes on the rights of other students, or fails to meet the school’s 
                                                                                                                                           
 41. See 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988). 
 42. Id. at 263. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 270. 
 45. See id. at 270-71.  
 46. See id. at 271.  
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. (“Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over this second form of 
student expression to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is 
designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be 
inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are 
not erroneously attributed to the school.”). 
 49. See id. at 271-72. 
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standards. This gives schools the broad ability to regulate and sup-
press speech deemed poorly written, insufficiently researched, 
grammatically unsound, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or obscene, or 
inappropriate for young audiences.50 The Court, continuing its trend 
in deferring to school authorities, concluded that school officials do 
not violate students’ First Amendment rights “by exercising editorial 
control over the style and content of student speech in school-
sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”51 Thus, the Court held 
that the principal did not violate the students’ rights because he had 
the authority to exercise such control, and his actions were reasona-
ble.52 By the end of the twentieth century, the standard for regulating 
on-campus student speech was clearly established, but the standard for 
deciding cases involving off-campus student speech remained unclear. 
C.  Morse v. Frederick: A Missed Opportunity  
 Morse presented the Supreme Court with a prime opportunity to 
resolve any uncertainties clouding First Amendment jurisprudence 
for student speech cases involving off-campus speech and to poten-
tially provide guidance for a new subcategory of off-campus speech—
online speech.53 However, the Court exhibited extreme reluctance re-
garding the prospect of delving into new issues and delivered a very 
narrow holding, which did little to clarify the uncertainty plaguing 
lower courts deciding these cases.54  
 The circumstances surrounding the contested speech made this 
case unique. Several students displayed a large banner containing 
the phrase “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” while standing across the street 
from their school watching the Olympic Torch Relay as it passed 
through town.55 The torch relay occurred during school hours, but the 
school permitted its students and staff to leave class to participate in 
the relay from either side of the street in front of the school.56 Mean-
while, school officials and teachers supervised the student participa-
tion.57 Thus, the event was not school-related and did not physically 
occur within school boundaries, but it occurred during school hours, 
extremely near the school, and the audience consisted of many stu-
dents and school faculty members.58 Joseph Frederick, the student 
challenging the school’s ability to suspend him for this speech, ar-
                                                                                                                                           
 50. See id. 
 51. Id. at 273.  
 52. See id. at 274.  
 53. See generally Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 54. See id. 
 55. Id. at 397.  
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 




gued that this was not a school speech case since his speech did not 
occur at school.59 While the Court noted that “[t]here is some uncer-
tainty at the outer boundaries as to when courts should apply school 
speech precedents,”60 the Court ultimately rejected Frederick’s argu-
ment based on the following circumstances of the relay: it occurred 
during normal school hours, the principal approved it as a social 
event or class trip, school faculty members supervised the students, 
and the festivities included performances by the school’s band and 
cheerleaders.61 Thus, the Court treated Frederick’s off-campus 
speech, which occurred beyond the school’s physical boundaries, as 
though it was on-campus speech by classifying the relay as a school-
sanctioned activity with adult supervision, effectively making it re-
semble typical student speech cases. This determination may not 
have ultimately affected the immediate outcome of the case, but it 
did enable the Court to avoid addressing the question of schools’ au-
thority to punish student expression that occurs off-campus (such as 
online speech).  
 After determining that this was indeed a student speech case, the 
Court analyzed the issue in the context of its past school speech deci-
sions, distinguishing this speech from the speech addressed in its 
past decisions.62 The Court stated that Bethel and Hazelwood both 
confirm that “the rule of Tinker is not the only basis for restricting 
student speech.”63 It rejected the dissent’s argument that Frederick’s 
speech was protected because it was political expression about the 
national debate over the criminalization of drug use and possession.64 
The Court dismissed both Bethel and Hazelwood as inapplicable—
Bethel because the speech was not sexual or “plainly offensive”65 and 
Hazelwood because “no one would reasonably believe that Frederick’s 
banner bore the school’s imprimatur.”66  
 The Court’s decision was based on its finding that the speech 
could be “reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.”67 The 
Court held that the important government interest in deterring 
schoolchildren from using drugs, in light of the uniqueness of the 
school environment in which school officials are responsible for pro-
tecting children, justified the school’s disciplinary action.68 The prin-
                                                                                                                                           
 59. See id. at 399-400. 
 60. Id. at 401. 
 61. See id. at 400-01.  
 62. Id. at 403-07. 
 63. Id. at 406. 
 64. See id. at 403.  
 65. Id. at 443 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 
478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)). 
 66. Id. at 405 (majority opinion).  
 67. Id. at 409.  
 68. Id. at 407-08.  
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cipal acted immediately in response to Frederick’s speech, knowing 
his actions would send an important message to the rest of the stu-
dent body, and the Court concluded that his actions were reasonable 
given that Frederick violated well-established school policy.69 Thus, 
the Court held that “[t]he First Amendment does not require schools 
to tolerate at school events student expression that contributes to 
those dangers [of illegal drug use].”70 
 Some academics have asserted that Morse substantially expanded 
public schools’ ability to regulate and restrict student speech, such 
that this decision may potentially equip schools with doctrinal justifi-
cation for regulating online, off-campus student speech.71 However, 
such a conclusion has proven to be at least partially inaccurate to 
date. The Court limited its decision tremendously by determining 
that the student’s expression occurred at a school-sponsored event, 
thus satisfying the geographical nexus requirement.72 Also, the Court 
concluded that the school’s disciplinary action was justified by its pol-
icy against promoting illegal drug use.73 The juxtaposition of these 
two findings severely narrows the scope of the Court’s decision in 
Morse, making its applicability to future cases very limited. Addi-
tionally, both of these findings reveal that the Court in Morse, de-
spite its refusal to address some of the potential implications of this 
decision, adhered to precedent in applying well-established standards 
for deciding First Amendment cases.  
III.   HOW LOWER COURTS ARE GRAPPLING WITH DOCTRINAL             
UNCERTAINTY: AN ANALYSIS OF LOWER COURT CASES INVOLVING    
POTENTIALLY “OFF-CAMPUS” SPEECH 
 While lower courts and scholars alike hoped that the Supreme 
Court would utilize Morse as an opportunity to clear the “doctrinal 
                                                                                                                                           
 69. See id. at 410.  
 70. Id. 
 71. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 
1027, 1055 (2008). See generally Morse, 551 U.S. at 425-47, for some of the dissenting 
Justices’ expressions of similar concerns. See also id. at 426 (Breyer, J., dissenting), for 
Justice Breyer’s specific fear that this decision could authorize increased viewpoint-based 
restrictions.  
 72. See Papandrea, supra note 71, at 1054-55. Had the Court not rejected the 
student’s arguments and found that this was on-campus speech, it would have been forced 
to decide many of the questions that remain unanswered, such as what is the standard for 
determining whether speech is on-campus speech or not. Id.  
 73. Morse, 551 U.S. at 410. The Court concluded that the speech promoted illegal 
activity but did not say whether this constituted incitement. Such a finding would further 
support the Court’s decision because it has traditionally held that the First Amendment 
does not protect speech aimed at inciting illegal activity. However, it is unlikely that the 
speech was substantially likely to cause imminent harm, the standard used in incitement 
cases. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 




fog infecting student speech jurisprudence,”74 the Court responded 
with an extremely limited holding that perpetuated or worsened the 
lingering ambiguity plaguing this area of law.75 The effect of Morse on 
future student speech cases remains uncertain given that Morse was 
decided only five years ago, and the Supreme Court has not heard 
another student speech case since then. Most lower courts have de-
cided recent student speech cases primarily based on the Tinker 
standard, despite the new issues implicated by student expression 
disseminated using modern technology.76 These decisions do not rely 
heavily on Morse, which they note fails to provide guidance on the 
subject of how online speech should be treated by courts.77  This Part 
explores some of the various approaches lower courts have used in 
deciding these cases, dividing them into two main categories—those 
that analyze the case using a traditional Tinker approach and those 
that apply Tinker only after making an important threshold determi-
nation about the geographic location from which the speech originated.78  
A.  Courts Applying Tinker Regardless of Location of the Speech 
 Many lower courts have decided student speech cases involving 
off-campus speech by simply applying the analysis from Tinker, 
treating that standard as controlling regardless of where the speech 
originated.79 In LaVine v. Blaine School District, the Ninth Circuit 
was among the first to adopt such an approach, though this case pre-
dated Morse and the off-campus speech was not online speech.80 The 
court held that the school was justified in expelling a student for 
writing a violent poem that described killing his classmate.81 The 
student brought the poem to school and showed it to several class-
mates and a teacher.82 Despite that the poem was written off-campus 
in the student’s free time and had no connection to any school as-
signment or activity, the court analyzed the speech based on Tinker, 
without giving any weight to the poem’s disconnect from the school or 
                                                                                                                                           
 74. Alison Virginia King, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the Online 
Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845, 875 (2010) (quoting 
Bill Mears, High Court Hears ‘Bong Hits 4 Jesus’ Case, CNN (Mar. 19, 2007), 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/LAW/03/19/free.speech/index.html? iref=newssearch). 
 75. See Papandrea, supra note 71, at 1053-58 (discussing the doctrinal uncertainty 
after Morse and how lower courts are dealing with such). 
 76. See id. at 1056-58.  
 77. See id. at 1053-58. 
 78. See J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 
1103-04 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (discussing various courts’ use of these approaches).  
 79. See id. at 1103.  
 80. See generally LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001).  
 81. Id. at 983. 
 82. Id. at 984. 
982  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:971 
 
its off-campus origins.83 The court implied that the geographical 
origin of the poem was immaterial because Tinker applied to both on-
campus and off-campus speech alike.84 Given that the student 
brought the poem to school himself and showed it to students and a 
teacher, the court concluded that the school reasonably concluded 
that the poem would cause a substantial disruption of the school’s 
activities, which justified the school’s decision to punish him for his 
speech.85 Similar reasoning has been used in some of the other cir-
cuits, including cases regarding online speech.  
 The Eighth Circuit has adopted a similar approach for deciding 
these cases. In D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Public School District 
No. 60, the court upheld a school’s suspension of a high school stu-
dent for sending instant messages to a classmate discussing getting a 
gun and shooting students at school.86 The court distinguished this 
case from previous student speech cases heard by the Supreme Court 
because, in this case, the student threatened violence and his expres-
sion did not occur during school or a school-sanctioned event.87 How-
ever, the Court still found that Tinker was the controlling standard 
because the Tinker Court specifically explained that the material and 
substantial disruption standard applied “in class or out of it.”88 The 
court found that it was reasonably foreseeable that the student’s 
speech would cause a material and substantial disruption within the 
school environment, and the speech did, in fact, have such an effect.89 
Thus, the school’s actions were justified both on those grounds and 
because of the nature of instant messaging, which enables rapid 
communication both in and out of school. It explained that while 
schools cannot actively seek to find, monitor, and restrict such out-of-
school speech, when it is brought to their attention they must re-
spond quickly and decide how to act to ensure school order.90 Thus, 
                                                                                                                                           
 83. Id. at 989 (reasoning that because the speech did not fall into the categories 
governed by Fraser or Hazelwood in that it was neither vulgar and offensive speech nor 
school-sponsored speech, it must be governed by Tinker, which was the third, all-inclusive 
category). 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id.  
 86. 647 F.3d 754, 756-57 (2011).  
 87. Id. at 761. 
 88. Id. at 765 (emphasis added) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. 
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)). It is unclear exactly what the Supreme Court was 
referring to when it said “or out of it,” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513; however, it seems as though 
this actually refers to expression that occurs on-campus during school activities taking 
place outside of the classroom. This interpretation seems more accurate than the Eighth 
Circuit’s, because in the sentence preceding this quotation, the Court explained that 
students’ First Amendment rights continue to exist while on the playground, cafeteria, etc., 
which are school activities that take place on the school’s physical campus but outside of 
the classroom. Id. at 512-13. 
 89. Hannibal, 647 F.3d at 766. 
 90. Id. at 765. 




the Eighth Circuit is extremely deferential to school authority in 
these types of cases.  
B.  Courts Applying a Tinker-Hybrid Approach:  
Applying the Substantial Disruption Standard After a Threshold    
Geographic Nexus Determination 
 Other courts have held that the location of the speech, be it the 
literal geographic location or a forged nexus created by the speech’s 
connection to the school, is an important threshold issue that courts 
must address before applying Tinker.91 The Seventh Circuit was 
among the first to use such an approach, applying it to a case involv-
ing an underground student newspaper. It held that schools can reg-
ulate speech that originates off-campus when it makes its way within 
school boundaries in a meaningful way.92  
 The Second Circuit has adopted a similar approach, applying it to 
online student speech cases. In Wisniewski v. Board of Education, the 
court upheld the school district’s suspension of a student who used 
America Online instant messaging to transmit a drawing of a teacher 
being shot.93 It explained that determining whether there was a nex-
us between the school and the student’s off-campus speech was nec-
essary because “[t]he fact that [his] creation and transmission of the 
[instant message] icon occurred away from school property does not 
necessarily insulate him from school discipline.”94 The court deter-
mined that even though the student created and shared the drawing 
using his home computer during after-school hours, “it was reasona-
bly foreseeable that the IM icon would come to the attention of school 
authorities” and that it might cause a substantial disruption in 
school activities.95 Thus, the threshold determination regarding the 
geographic location of speech is not solely based on where the speech 
was created. If the nature of the speech connects it to the school, such 
that the risk of it causing a substantial disruption of school activities 
is reasonably foreseeable, then there is a sufficient geographic nexus 
between the speech and the school to warrant the application of 
Tinker.96 Here, since the nexus requirement was satisfied, the court 
concluded that based on Tinker the school’s disciplinary action      
was justified, and its restriction of online off-campus speech                   
was permissible.97  
                                                                                                                                           
 91. See J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 
1104-06 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 92. Boucher v. Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 821, 828-29 (7th Cir. 1998).  
 93. See 494 F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2007).  
 94. Id. at 39. 
 95. Id.  
 96. See id. at 38-40.  
 97. Id. at 40.  
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 The Second Circuit decided a later student speech case involving 
online off-campus student speech using this same approach. In Don-
inger v. Niehoff, the court held that a high school was justified in 
prohibiting a student from running for class office due to her Internet 
blog, which she created from her home computer during non-school 
hours.98 The blog harshly criticized school officials’ decision to cancel 
an event called “Jamfest.”99 The court determined that the threshold 
geographic nexus had been met because the expression contained in 
the blog directly implicated school activities and encouraged class-
mates to read and respond to it (which they did).100 The court con-
cluded that it was reasonably foreseeable that the blog would come to 
the school’s attention, disrupt school activities, and interfere with the 
school’s attempts to resolve the ensuing conflict that the blog depict-
ed.101 This finding was based on the nature of the blog, the language 
used, and the information contained therein, which the school 
claimed was inaccurate and misleading.102 Thus, despite the fact that 
the blog was not sexual, offensive, violent, or threatening, the court 
found that the blog unquestionably satisfied Tinker’s material and 
substantial disruption standard, and the school was justified in pun-
ishing the student.103  
 The Fourth Circuit has analyzed online student speech cases in 
the same manner as the Second Circuit, determining the location of 
the speech before proceeding to the Tinker analysis. In Kowalski v. 
Berkeley County Schools, the school suspended a high school student 
who used her home computer during after-school hours to create a 
Myspace104 group attacking a classmate.105 The group was named 
“S.A.S.H.,” which allegedly stood for either “Students Against Sluts 
With Herpes” or “Students Against Shay’s Herpes.”106 The court 
found that there was a sufficient nexus between the speech and the 
school’s pedagogical goals in protecting its students from such assaul-
tive speech.107 It explained that this nexus was reinforced by the fact 
that the student knew her speech would be accessed beyond her 
home and knew the likely effect the speech would have, such that it 
                                                                                                                                           
 98. 642 F.3d 334, 338 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 99. Id. at 340-41. 
 100. Id. at 348.  
 101. Id. 
 102. Id.  
 103. See id. at 349.  
 104. Myspace is a social media website. Its “About Myspace” page describes it as “a 
place where people come to connect, discover, and share . . . [w]ith roots in music and so-
cial, the platform is built to empower all artists—from musicians and designers to writers 
and photographers—helping them connect with audiences, collaborators, and partners to 
achieve their goals.” About Myspace, MYSPACE, https://myspace.com/pressroom/ 
aboutmyspace (last visited July 6, 2013).  
 105. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 106. Id. 
 107. See id. at 573. 




was reasonably foreseeable that her speech would permeate the 
school’s boundaries and affect school activities.108 The court applied 
Tinker and found that the student’s speech both disrupted school ac-
tivities and interfered with other students’ rights, namely those of 
the girl targeted by the speech.109 The court further reasoned that 
schools can regulate off-campus speech that enters and impacts the 
school in a significant way.110 It refused to limit schools’ ability to 
protect their interest in order, discipline, and safety by confining 
schools’ authority to the physical boundaries of their campuses.111  
 The Third Circuit used a similar approach in Layshock ex rel. 
Layshock v. Hermitage School District, explaining that schools can 
punish off-campus student speech the same way they punish on-
campus speech, but only if the speech resulted in a substantial dis-
ruption of school activities.112 Thus, under this approach, the court 
must determine whether the speech occurred off-campus before it 
asks whether the speech caused a disruption.113 This high school stu-
dent was suspended for ten days after using his home computer to 
create a fake Myspace profile mocking his principal.114 In this case, 
however, the court rejected the school’s argument that because the 
student’s profile mocked the principal, he had entered the school, ef-
fectively making his speech on-campus speech.115 The court found 
that the speech did not create a foreseeable, substantial disruption; 
therefore, the school district lacked the authority to punish the stu-
dent for his online off-campus speech merely because it was lewd and 
offensive.116 In reaching this holding, the court specifically stated that 
Bethel was inapplicable to speech that “occurred outside the school 
context.”117 Thus, the Third Circuit has adopted a more protective 
stance regarding students’ First Amendment rights, stating that “[i]t 
would be an unseemly and dangerous precedent to allow the state, in 
the guise of school authorities, to reach into a child’s home and con-
trol his/her actions there to the same extent that it can control that 
child when he/she participates in school sponsored activities.”118  
                                                                                                                                           
 108. See id.   
 109. See id. at 573-74. 
 110. Id. at 574. 
 111. See id.; see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007). The Supreme Court 
noted the uncertainty of the outer boundaries and scope of applicability of school speech 
precedents, but it refused to determine what those outer boundaries were. Morse, 551 U.S. 
at 401.  
 112. 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 113. See id. at 216.  
 114. Id. at 207, 210. 
 115. See id. at 219. 
 116. See id.  
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 216. 
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 Notably, the Supreme Court declined to hear Layshock and other 
similar cases in January of 2012, leaving the lower court’s decisions 
in place.119 Thus, the Supreme Court again refused to clarify this area 
of First Amendment jurisprudence, declining to hear another off-
campus online student speech case and leaving the lower courts 
without any guidance for resolving such issues.120 
C.  Lower Court Decisions: In General 
 Despite the varied approaches used by lower courts in deciding 
off-campus student speech cases, the outcomes are surprisingly con-
sistent. The courts apply Tinker and assess whether the student 
speech caused a material and substantial disruption in school activi-
ties or whether the risk of creating such was reasonably foreseeable. 
If that determination is answered in the affirmative, the courts gen-
erally defer to the schools and uphold their restriction on speech. The 
cases described above tend to show that the more violent and offen-
sive the student speech, the more likely the court is to find that it 
either caused or posed a reasonable risk of causing a substantial dis-
ruption. The one case in which the court found for the student in-
volved a fake Myspace profile, which although mildly offensive did 
not create such a disruption.121 Thus, the question seems to be about 
the potential or actual effects of the speech, which is much more fo-
cused on the nature and content of the speech than the location from 
which it originates.  
 Lower courts have grappled with the issue posed by online, off-
campus student speech cases, attempting to adhere to Supreme 
Court precedent as much as possible given the Supreme Court’s si-
lence on this increasingly salient issue. Most courts have applied 
some variation of the Tinker material and substantial disruption 
standard, with most incorporating an additional threshold geograph-
ic nexus or discussing other case law and factors in their decisions. 
The outcomes have varied, but there is a worrisome continuing trend 
within the Supreme Court (in earlier student speech cases) and the 
lower courts as both increasingly defer to school authority figures’ 
decisions on these issues, blindly upholding them regardless of the 
repercussions for students’ First Amendment rights. Whether or not 
this is the optimal result, there is an increasingly dire need for Su-
preme Court guidance on this issue as courts attempt to apply a 
                                                                                                                                           
 119. Id.; Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012) 
(denying cert.). 
 120. See Kim Watterson & Vic Walczak, Layshock v. Hermitage School District, ACLU 
OF PA., http://www.aclupa.org/legal/legaldocket/studentsuspendedforinterne.htm (last 
visited July 6, 2013). 
 121. See supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text. 




standard that was formulated over forty years ago, long before the 
advent of these technological innovations.  
IV.   POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
 It is evident that the lower courts need the Supreme Court to clar-
ify this area of First Amendment jurisprudence, but questions per-
taining to how the Supreme Court should decide this issue and what 
is the best solution are far less evident. This Note concludes that the 
best way to resolve the current state of uncertainty is a multi-faceted, 
comprehensive approach comprised of clear Supreme Court guidance, 
legislative action, school action, and parental action, which are all 
discussed in this Part.  
A.  How Courts Should Decide Online Off-Campus Speech Cases 
 Initially, the territorial approach used in several of the circuit 
courts122 would seem preferable to that of the courts that merely ap-
ply Tinker, in that the territorial approach at least acknowledges 
that there is a difference between off-campus speech and speech that 
occurs physically on-campus. However, some critics argue that the 
territorial approach gives schools too much authority generally to 
restrict student speech by allowing regulation whenever it is either 
directed at the school or it is reasonably foreseeable that the speech 
may come to the school’s attention.123 Courts using this approach 
have fairly reasoned that if there is no connection to the school, 
school officials lack the authority to regulate the speech.124 However, 
it seems as though nearly every court finds the requisite connection, 
so this standard practically guarantees that the court will uphold the 
school’s decision to restrict student expression and acts as a rubber 
stamp for these cases.125 Thus, they claim that this approach couches 
courts’ deference to schools’ authority in terms of a moot preliminary 
determination used to justify non-justifiable school actions.126  
 These same critics also reject the alternate approach, when courts 
use solely Tinker to decide off-campus student speech cases,127 argu-
ing that “the Tinker test is ill-suited to speech in the digital media.”128 
Proponents of this argument claim that using Tinker enables schools 
                                                                                                                                           
 122. See infra Part III.B. 
 123. See Papandrea, supra note 71, at 1102.  
 124. See id.  
 125. See id. at 1090-92. See also Renee L. Servance, Cyber-bullying, Cyber-Harassment, 
and the Conflict Between Schools and the First Amendment, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1213, 1224 
(arguing that “geographic distinction is no longer appropriate as a dispositive element in 
school speech cases”).    
 126. See Papandrea, supra note 71, at 1090-91.  
 127. See id. at 1102. 
 128. See id.  
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to use “standardless discretion”129 to prohibit effectively any speech of 
which they disapprove, especially when it is controversial or undesir-
able speech.130 As one critic explained, “[t]his approach threatens to 
grant schools virtually unlimited authority to restrict student ex-
pression because it is arguably foreseeable that virtually any speech 
that concerns the school, its personnel, or its students will come to 
the attention of school officials.”131 The fact that a student’s speech 
came to her school’s attention or may potentially distract other stu-
dents should not enable the school “to serve as a cultural censor.”132 
The Court has specifically stated that schools cannot restrict student 
expression merely because they dislike the message, applying ad hoc 
content-based restrictions on speech.133 Yet, courts using this ap-
proach are enabling schools to do precisely that. Thus, those who ad-
vance these arguments are unsatisfied with both of the approaches 
used by the lower courts in deciding online, off-campus student 
speech cases.  
 The Supreme Court needs to affirmatively resolve this gap in First 
Amendment jurisprudence by promulgating a standard for deciding 
the scope of schools’ authority to regulate off-campus student speech 
in general. Ideally, the Court should address the new questions im-
plicated by online off-campus student speech specifically, but at a 
minimum, it should address schools’ rights pertaining to off-campus 
speech in general. Online speech may even be deemed so unique that 
the Court should specifically tailor a standard for deciding such cases 
rather than formulating a general rule.  
 If the Court endeavors to decide a case involving off-campus online 
student speech, an important factor it should consider is the differ-
ence between the Internet and other modes of communication. In Re-
no v. ACLU, the Court discussed the differences between the Internet 
and other forms of communication in determining whether the Com-
munications Decency Act was constitutional.134 The Court noted that 
“[u]nlike communications received by radio or television, ‘the receipt 
of information on the Internet requires a series of affirmative steps 
more deliberate and directed than merely turning a dial. A child re-
quires some sophistication and some ability to read to retrieve mate-
                                                                                                                                           
 129.  Id. at 1092. 
 130. Id. at 1092-94.  
 131. Id. at 1102. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (stating 
that schools cannot restrict student speech based solely on a “desire to avoid the discomfort 
and unpleasantness that always accompan[ies] an unpopular viewpoint”); id. at 510 
(prohibiting schools from restricting speech merely to “avoid the controversy which might 
result from the expression”). 
 134. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 




rial and thereby to use the Internet unattended.’ ”135 Thus, the Court 
reasoned that publishing information on the Internet does not create 
the same problems created by radio and television broadcasting, in 
that the Internet is less invasive since people must affirmatively act 
to receive such information.136 Because one must deliberately seek 
out online speech, the only way for it to enter schools is by someone 
bringing it to campus, either by bringing a hard copy to school or ac-
cessing it on the Internet while at school.137 The Court also noted that 
the Internet “provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for 
communication of all kinds.”138 Given the minimally intrusive nature 
of the Internet and its ability to promote self-expression and contrib-
ute to the marketplace of ideas, the Court should protect students’ 
First Amendment rights and establish the narrow circumstances that 
warrant school regulation of students’ online, off-campus speech.  
 The most appropriate standard for these cases would be one simi-
lar to the “clear and present danger” test articulated in Justice 
Holmes’s famous dissent from Abrams v. United States,139 which was 
later adopted by the majority in Brandenburg v. Ohio.140 Such a test 
would be similar to the Tinker material and substantial disruption 
standard in that it would enable schools to regulate student speech 
based on the speech’s ability to cause a substantial disruption. How-
ever, the clear and present danger test is a stricter standard than 
Tinker because it requires that the speech creates a readily apparent 
danger, not merely a reasonably foreseeable risk of danger at some 
unknown future time.141 Justice Holmes reasoned that this standard 
was appropriate because maintaining the marketplace of ideas is so 
important to the functioning of a democratic society that the govern-
ment’s ability to suppress speech should be limited to situations in 
which there is an immediate danger that must be curtailed.142 The 
Court’s justification for such a standard should apply with equal 
force to student speech cases because schools are supposed to facili-
tate the creation of a marketplace of student ideas. Thus, the Court 
should apply a similar standard to student speech cases, especially 
when the speech occurs off-campus.  
                                                                                                                                           
 135. Id. at 854 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 845 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 
U.S. 844 (1997)).  
 136. Id. at 869. 
 137. Schools can prevent students from accessing the Internet at school by installing 
filtering software on their computers. See King, supra note 74, at 882-83; see also infra 
Part IV.B.2.  
 138. Reno, 521 U.S. at 870. 
 139. 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
 140. See 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 141. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 624-31. 
 142. See id. 
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B.  Other Solutions 
 1.   Legislative: 
 While legislation alone would likely be inappropriate and ill-
suited for regulating the general dilemma posed by online off-campus 
student speech, specific, well-crafted legislation may be a plausible 
solution for certain limited areas. For example, the use of legislation 
may be well-suited to address the increasing problem of cyber-
bullying. Legislation may be well-equipped to regulate this form of 
online, off-campus student speech,143 as evidenced by the increasing 
efforts of students, parents, schools, and Congress to implement such 
laws.144 Such legislation would be difficult to pass if the Supreme 
Court ruled that schools lack the authority to regulate online off-
campus student speech,145 but in light of the recent lower court deci-
sions addressing this issue,146 such a result seems improbable. 
 Historically, legislation has been used to regulate the publication 
and dissemination of indecent, lewd, obscene, and offensive materi-
als.147 Such legislation applies with equal force to online off-campus 
student speech that falls into this category and is well-suited to deal 
with that type of speech.  
 Thus, legislation that is specifically tailored to regulate certain 
types of student speech is a proper supplemental solution for regulat-
ing online off-campus student speech. However, legislation alone 
could not plausibly address the numerous and wide-ranging ques-
tions plaguing this area of law without implementing some form of 
overbroad, bright-line rule. Such legislation would be undesirable in this 
context because it would give school authorities too much discretion.  
 2.   Schools: 
 Schools enjoy an arsenal of diverse strategies that they could use 
to try to decrease or prevent the dissemination (both on-campus and 
off-campus) of the types of speech that have been restricted in stu-
dent speech cases. Many schools use filtering software to block unde-
sirable web sites from school computers.148 This prohibits students 
from accessing these sites and the student speech contained there-
                                                                                                                                           
 143. This dangerous activity may also be engaged in by non-students, but since it is 
most problematic within the context of schools, a discussion of the potential for non-student 
participants is beyond the scope of this Note.  
 144. See generally King, supra note 74 (noting the many lobbying efforts of parents and 
schools to encourage Congress to adopt such legislation).  
 145. See id.  
 146. See discussion supra Part III. 
 147. See generally Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (upholding a state 
obscenity law and explaining that obscenity is a category of unprotected speech).  
 148. See King, supra note 74, at 882-83. 




in.149 As a result, students’ use of the sites may potentially decrease, 
but more importantly, this effectively prevents students from bring-
ing off-campus speech into schools, decreasing the ability of such 
speech to create a substantial disruption in school activities. Alt-
hough students could still bring that speech to school by either bring-
ing a hard copy of it or using their smart phones—activities that can 
also be regulated by the school—students’ ability to access the speech 
at school is still limited by this strategy.  
 The most effective and comprehensive solution is for schools to do 
exactly what they are designed to do—educate people. Schools should 
educate both parents and students on a wide variety of issues posed 
by the Internet, including cyberbullying, Internet safety, dangers of 
the Internet, potential negative ramifications of posting indecent pic-
tures or offensive speech, and more. They should similarly educate 
parents and students about tolerance, etiquette, civility, and positive 
forms of expression. Schools should not only educate parents but also 
encourage them to educate, monitor, and punish their children ac-
cordingly. Educating parents and students about these issues is a 
potentially thorough and effective way to deal with the problems cre-
ated by online speech. This is also a desirable approach because it 
lacks the detrimental effects of many other solutions in that it is un-
likely to chill speech or inhibit student expression.  
 Another way schools can decrease, if not prevent, the instances of 
damaging student speech is by implementing and enforcing discipli-
nary policies, academic standards, and other school regulations de-
signed to specifically address the issue at hand. When such regula-
tions are narrowly tailored to the specific problem they aim to ad-
dress, and school officials make them widely known, the students 
have fair notice of the parameters of acceptable online speech and 
can navigate within them accordingly. Ideally, by narrowly tailoring 
rules and promulgating specific guidelines for what is and is not ac-
ceptable, students are more likely to abstain from “deviant” behavior 
because they know the rules. Similarly, making students acutely 
aware of the potential ramifications deters much of the contested 
student expression because it forces students to weigh the costs and 
benefits of their actions before they act.  
 3.   Parents:  
 Parents, even more so than schools, occupy the ideal position to 
promote positive online expression and discourage that which might 
be considered problematic. Parents should educate their children 
about the proper use of the Internet (and other technology like smart 
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phones) and the potential consequences for their misuse. They should 
address this issue early on, providing their children with accurate 
and reliable information to counteract the information received by 
peers and other sources of information. Similarly, parents should im-
plement their own guidelines or rules for using technology and disci-
pline their children appropriately for violating them.  
 In nearly all the cases that dealt with the issue of off-campus stu-
dent speech, the speech at issue was created and disseminated from 
the students’ home computers. Given this recurring theme, parents 
seem especially well-suited to address the issue of online speech. Ad-
ditionally, parents are in a better position than schools to monitor 
and supervise their children’s activities and punish them accordingly. 
Parents may also choose to be proactive and use filtering software on 
their home computer.  
 Parents may be the most effective and comprehensive solution to 
the problem of regulating online off-campus student speech because 
they can monitor and restrict most, if not all, avenues of expression. 
Parents control whether their children have a smart phone and other 
similar forms of technology that provide children with additional ac-
cess to the Internet and could potentially enable students to circum-
vent school or family rules regulating computer usage.  
 The prevalence of online off-campus student speech cases will like-
ly decrease dramatically if students are educated and discouraged 
from creating online speech that is potentially problematic, whether 
it be violent in nature, assaultive towards fellow students or school 
officials, or otherwise disruptive.  
V.   CONCLUSION 
 In the centuries since the First Amendment was written, many 
new forms of expression have emerged and become increasingly 
prevalent, presenting the Supreme Court with various opportunities 
to determine how the First Amendment applies to these new chan-
nels. Younger generations tend to enthusiastically embrace techno-
logical innovations, a trend that is evidenced by children’s use of the 
Internet, smart phones, and other similar technology. In the digital 
age, most students express themselves primarily through electronic 
means, which seem to have replaced the use of pens and paper.  
 Digital expression plays a crucial role in students’ lives, but tech-
nology is a paradoxical, double-edged sword in the twenty-first centu-
ry. The Internet and smart phones abound with expressive possibili-
ties—students can communicate with others, express themselves, 
and publish their expression instantly. The Internet promotes the 
quintessential “marketplace of ideas” and realization of democratic 
ideals by enabling students to receive endless information and edu-




cate themselves on a wide variety of issues so that they may filter 
information and form their own opinions. Yet, the benefits of the Inter-
net are accompanied by many potentially detrimental consequences. 
 When student expression is brought to school, it can disrupt 
school activities by violating the rights of other students, threatening 
the school’s ability to maintain order, and undermining the school’s 
educational mission. Thus, the paradoxical nature of schools requires 
a balancing of competing interests, leaving courts with a troublesome 
dilemma—where does one draw the line between promoting the crea-
tion of a marketplace of ideas, learning, and expression versus main-
taining order and discipline in schools so that they can fulfill their 
educational missions?  
 The Supreme Court theoretically drew that line over forty years 
ago when it decided Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District150 and promulgated the standard for student speech 
cases. The Tinker standard, under which schools may regulate stu-
dent expression when it causes a substantial and material disruption 
of school activities or infringes upon the rights of others,151 is still be-
ing applied today but in the new, unanticipated context of online stu-
dent speech cases. The Supreme Court needs to answer affirmatively 
the question of whether schools can regulate off-campus student 
speech, and, if so, the Court should create a clear standard for de-
termining whether and when speech is “off-campus” speech. The sig-
nificant differences between the types of speech being regulated to-
day and the speech at issue in Tinker reveal the need to reevaluate 
that case and determine whether it is the appropriate standard for 
this unprecedented issue.  
 Courts have increasingly deferred to schools in student speech 
cases, and the future of students’ First Amendment rights have been 
undeniably jeopardized. The Supreme Court has conceded that chil-
dren’s First Amendment rights are not necessarily co-extensive with 
that of adults.152 Yet, it has also repeatedly emphasized that children 
do not shed their First Amendment rights at the schoolhouse gate.153 
As courts continue to erode students’ First Amendment rights both 
on and off campus, one cannot help but wonder how much further the 
Supreme Court will let lower courts diminish these rights before it 
steps in and, hopefully, reinvigorates them. Until then, one question 
remains unresolved—have students been forced to shed their rights 
at the keyboard, as well as at the schoolhouse gate?  
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